Ghaza Conflict

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We have written something on Ghaza Conflict, a few months ago but recently found a very interesting essay from a website in which Professor Paul Rogers, Global Security Consultant to Oxford Research Group (ORG – http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk) analyses the background to the outbreak of violent hostilities in the Gaza strip. He looks beyond the current crisis to the likely larger ramifications of these events, arguing that prolonged use of extreme force will not achieve security for the region.This is reproduced with thanks to author and website.

A ceasefire may still be called in Gaza in the near future, but whatever the eventual outcome of the conflict, the manner of its development so far already has long-term significance.

The background to the conflict

There is much dispute as to how the tenuous six-month ceasefire between Israel and Hamas broke down. The Israeli government points to the numerous examples of rockets fired into southern Israel, and its particular concern that Hamas has been able to acquire longer-range, if inaccurate, rockets smuggled in from Egypt, in addition to the much larger number of crude rockets produced within Gaza. Hamas, in turn, points to a number of examples of Israeli attacks during the ceasefire. One of these, a commando raid on 4th November 2008 that killed six Hamas paramilitaries, was followed by a near-total blockade of the border. This coincided with the US Presidential Election and attracted very little media coverage but was followed by an escalation in the firing of rockets into Israel.

It is certainly the case that the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) had undertaken very detailed planning and training for a major air and ground offensive to be directed at Hamas, including a substantial increase in infantry training for urban warfare. Much of this was concentrated at a new facility, the National Urban Training Centre, the mock Arab town of Baladia in the Negev complete with refugee camp. This was built for the IDF by the US Army Corps of Engineers, financed largely by US military aid and has been in operation for the past eighteen months.

The war started with an intense aerial operation involving 88 Israeli strike aircraft attacking 100 pre-planned targets in under four minutes. 400 more targets were hit within the first week of the war, and the Hamas paramilitary organisation undoubtedly experienced substantial disruption and large numbers of casualties, especially in the first attack. In spite of this, 30 or more rockets continued to be fired into southern Israel each day and the second week of the war saw up to 10,000 Israeli ground troops moving into the Gaza strip, supported by strike aircraft, helicopter gunships, artillery and tanks.

A few months we wrote about Ghaza conflict. Recently I visited a website where I found a very intersting article which is reproduced with thanks to the website http://www.ekklesia.co.uk/node/8362 where you can read research papers.

“By the end of the second week, most of the rural parts of Gaza were under Israeli military occupation, but there had been few efforts to enter into the densely populated urban areas, particularly Gaza City, Khan Younis and the Jabaliya and Beach Camp refugee settlements. There was some evidence that most of the Hamas paramilitaries had successfully re-grouped after the initial air strikes but were being cautious about engaging with Israeli infantry outside of the built-up areas. Furthermore, in spite of the extent of the Israeli military operation and at least 50 further air strikes each day, rockets continued to be launched into Israel.

At this stage, the official Israeli war aim was still to end the rocket attacks, although many analysts contended that the wider aim was to terminate the Hamas regime. Israel’s minimum demand for a ceasefire was thus an end to the rocket attacks and the closure of arms smuggling routes from Egypt. For Hamas it was a complete Israeli military withdrawal and an end to the blockade. Domestic support for the Israeli government remained strong but the very large number of civilian casualties, including over 200 children, and unprecedented criticism from the UN Relief and Works Agency and the International Committee for the Red Cross both added to a mood of antagonism towards Israeli actions in much of Europe and deep anger and resentment across the Middle East.

Israeli motivations

The context of the conflict is complex. Electoral timescales are significant in at least three respects. The war started with the Bush administration having less than four weeks left, but its support was crucial to Israel. While the incoming Obama administration has many senior officials who are intrinsically positive in their support for Israel, there is still an uncertainty about the new administration’s policies. Within Israel, a closely-fought election is due on 10 February and there is an expectation that a Binyamin Netanyahu-led Likud Party will do well. A “successful” war could instead aid both the Kadima Party led by Foreign Minister Tsipi Livni and the Labour Party under Defence Minister Ehud Barak. Finally, elections are due in Lebanon in August and while Hezbollah emerged greatly strengthened after the Second Lebanon war in 2006, a new conflict with Israel could result in such damage to the Lebanese economy that Hezbollah would lose out at the polls.

Israel’s determination to engage in a war likely to cause high civilian casualties has to be understood in terms of its own perception of insecurity. Although it is a singularly powerful country with formidable conventional forces having access to advanced US equipment and backed up by a substantial nuclear arsenal, it still has an experience of persistent insecurity that is difficult for outside observers to understand. This goes back to the severe losses of the 1973 Yom Kippur/Ramadan War and its marked contrast with the extraordinary military success of the Six Day War of 1967. The failures in Lebanon in 1982-85 are also pertinent as the IDF was forced to retreat in the wake of persistent guerrilla actions by Hezbollah.

Even so, the Lebanon experience of the mid-1980s was a military reversal that had little effect on the domestic security of Israel itself – more important was the experience of the Iraqi Scud missile attacks in 1991, and the more recent experience of suicide bomb attacks, especially in the early part of the present decade. Even more worrying for Israeli strategists was the experience of the 2006 War with Hezbollah, especially the extent to which large parts of northern Israel were at risk from missile attacks, with the IDF unable to defeat Hezbollah, and the repeated launching of smaller rockets from Gaza.

All of these weapons are crude unguided short-range systems with a very limited explosive capability, but that is not the point. Their very unpredictability means that they induce a widespread feeling of fear and impotence in a state that prides itself on its ability to defend itself through its powerful military forces. December 2008’s briefing in the Oxford Research Group’s monthly series of International Security Briefings (Irregular Warfare and Revolts from the Margins)looked at the evolution of irregular warfare from a global perspective, and Israel’s experience with both Hezbollah and Hamas are specific examples with much wider implications.

Moreover, much of the concern of the Israeli security establishment is the manner in which the use of short-range ground-launched missiles relates to Iran. While much of the weaponry may originate in Russia, Ukraine and China, the main channels of supply go through Iran and Syria. The Israelis also have a particular concern with Iran’s substantial programme of developing and deploying much longer-range missiles, along with its presumed nuclear ambitions – the memories of the 1991 Iraqi Scud attacks are still strong.

In summary, Israel is determined to maintain its security primarily through the use of intensive military force and believes that it is aided in this by the support it receives from the United States. There is no immediate prospect of a change in this outlook unless there are unexpectedly radical alterations in US Middle East policy under Barack Obama.

Israel and Egypt

Israel is adamantly opposed to Hamas and sees it purely as a terrorist organisation linked to its own “axis of evil” comprising Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran and, to an extent, Syria. It cannot accept that Hamas has a legitimacy by having sufficient popular support to win an election, nor does it accept that Hamas has been widely seen in Gaza as a far more effective representation of Palestinian aspirations than Fatah, especially with the latter’s endemic problems of corruption. Israel finds the Gaza situation deeply problematic and it must be remembered that its withdrawal from the territory in 2005 was not part of a peace process but because a continued occupation in support of a very small group of settlers was economically and militarily unviable.

It is also not widely recognised that the Egyptian government is opposed to Hamas – indeed its treatment of Palestinians crossing the border from Gaza in recent months has frequently been non-cooperative and even aggressive. The Mubarak regime fears Hamas because of its potential effect on its own massive underclass, for whom Hamas can be seen as a figurehead organisation opposing exploitation. This is a powerful narrative and does much to explain the Egyptian elite’s willingness to work closely with Israel. Egypt’s concern about Hamas is shared, to an extent, by other elite regimes across the region, some of whom are also concerned with Iranian influence, even if Hamas draws its support almost entirely from Sunni communities.

It is also frequently forgotten that the great majority of the people in Gaza are refugees or the descendents of refugees, primarily from the Israeli War of Independence of 1948, whereas most Palestinians in the West Bank are not. The refugee issue is far more important in Gaza. There is also one crucial element that provides support for Hamas, in that the uniform view in Gaza is that Israel as a state is not in any way interested in seeing a viable Palestinian state being created. This may not be the case, since many Israelis do support such a settlement, but recent Israeli actions on the West Bank provide much support for the Hamas view.

Thus, if Israel says that Hamas must give up its opposition to the existence of the State of Israel before any kind of negotiation can ensue, then Hamas politicians point to the failure of the concessions that Fatah has made on this issue to have kind of positive impact. It is not difficult for them to make this case since the recent experience in the West Bank is of many thousands of additional settlers, the maintenance of extraordinarily strict security procedures that hugely limit economic activity, and over 10,000 Palestinians detained without trial.

Put bluntly, the deeply entrenched Israeli view is that security can only come through military strength and the willingness to use very high levels of force, whatever the international reaction, as long as it continues to have the backing of the United States. Hamas believes that there is no alternative to armed opposition and that Israel will not respond to weak opponents. In the first two weeks of the war it has gained much status across the Middle East and beyond. Moreover, this is a conflict that is widely seen in the region as something close to a joint Israeli/American operation against an impoverished and overcrowded community, with this having important implications for longer-term radicalisation.

Conclusion

It is highly unlikely that the Israeli war against Hamas can completely destroy the movement. However much it may be possible to limit the paramilitary capabilities of the organisation, the civil casualties and levels of destruction will further embed opposition to Israel within Gaza, and more widely among Palestinians in the West Bank. It will also result in much more widespread anti-Israeli and anti-American radicalisation with unpredictable consequences.

There have been many major conflicts involving the establishment and consolidation of the State of Israel, including 1946-8, 1956, 1967, 1973, 1982-5, two intifadas, and Lebanon in 2006, but the Gaza War of 2008-09 may end up being the one conflict that finally makes it clear that sustainable security for Israel cannot be achieved by the intense use of military force. At the time of writing that is difficult to argue, certainly within Israel, and it is unlikely to be recognised there without the intervention of outside states. One of the enduring tragedies of the current conflict is that it is happening when there are significant proposals being developed, especially the Arab Peace Initiative, which do provide a realistic way forward. (see ORG’s November 2008 briefing paper, The Arab Peace Initiative: Why Now? – http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/publications/briefing_papers/api.p…).

This research essay has been adapted from the January 2009 Monthly Security Briefing from the Oxford Research Group (http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/), with grateful acknowledgement.

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(c) Paul Rogers is Professor of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford and Global Security Consultant to Oxford Research Group (ORG). His international security monthly briefings are available from the ORG website at http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk. He also writes a regular column for OpenDemocracy – http://www.opendemocracy.net/taxonomy/term/1709

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Categories: Peace and Our World
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May
5

What is Peacemaking?

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Peacemaking is a complicated concept because peace can be defined in so many different ways. For our purposes, peacemaking is not a process of passive acceptance of mistreatment, a turning of the other cheek in the face of clear injustice or abuse, or other weak images of meekness or nonresistance. Instead, peacemaking is a vibrant, powerful concept. At its best, peacemaking creates relational and structural justice that allows for social and personal well being. This is an ideal objective, perhaps not attainable in all conflicts. Nevertheless, peacemaking implies the use of cooperative, constructive processes to resolve human conflicts, while restoring relationships. Peacemaking does not deny the essential need for adversary processes, but peacemaking places adversary processes into a larger perspective. Litigating disputes is not seen as a primary dispute resolution mechanism, but as a last-resort process.

When we speak of peace, we understand it in two ways. First, there is negative peace. Negative peace means the absence of violence, typically through coercion rather than cooperation. When Mom tells Sally to stop beating up on Sarah, she is imposing a negative peace in the household. Sally’s conflict with Sarah is not resolved, but merely suppressed. The concept of negative peace extends not only from our mundane example in the home, but also to international peace. International peace is said to exist during a cessation of violence and hostility. This form of peace is often imposed by U.N. peacekeepers. Again, peace is defined as an absence of war and is imposed coercively. Our law enforcement mechanisms, euphemistically called criminal justice, create another form of negative peace. The bad guys are taken off the street so that crimes are reduced. Thus, law enforcement officials are called “peace” officers even though they use extremely coercive and sometimes violent means to achieve their ends. Finally, the legal system perpetuates a form of negative peace. At best, the civil justice system renders a fair and impartial decision. However, the result is just a decision, not a resolution to or transformation of the conflict. Upon judgment, the legal conflict is finished and people are expected to get on with their lives. Generally speaking, however, the underlying causes of the conflict are left unresolved. How satisfied are a father and daughter after a judgment in favor of one or the other after a bitterly contested trial? So, the legal system does not provide for peace; it only provides for decisions.

The second way of understanding peace is as positive peace. Positive peace implies reconciliation and restoration through creative transformation of conflict. In positive peace, Mom sits Sally and Sarah down and invites them to exchange stories about what led to their fight. Mom and Sarah learn for the first time that Sally feels angry at the way Sarah ignores her. In five minutes, they work out a plan that allows Sally the safety and security to speak out about what she is feeling. Sarah promises to listen more carefully to Sally. Sally promises not to hit Sarah when she, Sally, becomes frustrated. The fighting has stopped, but more importantly the relationship has been reconciled and restored. In the process, Sally and Sarah have grown morally just a little. In the same way, a lawyer as peacemaker looks at conflict not just as an abstract, intellectual exercise in analysis and persuasion, but as an opportunity to help people reconcile. When reconciliation is not possible, separation and resolution is possible with a minimum of hostility and acrimony.

So peacemaking concerns a deeper way of looking at conflicts than just winning or losing. It looks at conflicts as opportunities for people to grow, to accept responsibility for the relationships they are in, and for the potential of apology and forgiveness.

Idealistic? Not at all! Time after time, when people are placed in a safe and secure environment, they naturally seek out their capacity for goodness. Even the most cynical, hardened business people have recognized the importance of relationships when they are invited and allowed to do so. We don’t see this side of people often only because they are not given the space, safety and security to express their anger, their true concerns and their interests. Furthermore, they are not placed in a position where they can honestly listen and hear the perspectives of others. Perhaps the greatest difference between peacemaking and other forms of conflict resolution is that opportunities for exploitation are taken away. Once the fear of vulnerability is neutralized, people can aspire to their higher good and really find excellent solutions to their conflicts.

Written by Douglas Noll Source:  www.mediate.com

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Categories: Peace and Our World
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May
5

Basic of Peace to be Observed by each nation

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In the following excerpt, Günther Gugel and Uli Jäger from the Institute for Peace Education Tübingen deal with the principles of peace education work, which can be determined as negative – against force – and positive – in favor of peace.

“Since the middle of the sixties, reference has been made in peace education to the concept of peace and force as postulated by Johan Galtung. The Norwegian peace researcher suggests that we talk of force when one of then following basic needs of man has been violated: survival, general physical well-being, personal identity or the freedom to choose between various possibilities. Force is always present when people are influenced in a way that makes them incapable of evolving in a manner that is feasible (structural force). He states the following as an example: “A life expectancy of only thirty years was not an expression of force in the stone age, but the same life expectancy today (whether due to war, social injustice or both) would be classified as force according to our definition.”

After Galtung had differentiated at the end of the sixties between personal or direct force on the ones hand and structural force on the other, he now goes one step further: “I mostly work using a triangle today: direct force, structural force and cultural force. Structural force violates needs, but nobody is a direct perpetrator and responsible in this sense. Cultural force is the legitimization of structural or direct force by culture”.Johan Galtung’s concept has not only evoked approval but also criticism, in recent times most strongly from the ‘Commission on Violence. This is an independent group of experts summoned by the government of the Federal Republic of Germany to provide analyses and suggestions for avoiding violence, whose four volume ‘Report on Force’ was published in 1990. The commission used a narrowly defined notion of force in its studies, with ‘forms of physical force’ being central to this notion. By using the term structural force “the notion of force mushrooms out into strictly inflationary proportions, since every form of preventing human potential for development could be defined as force (…).”

The limited definition of force steers the search for the causes towards deficiencies and deficits in the personal character of the violent individual and the social educational institutions of which he is a subject. Political conflicts are transformed into legal ones in this manner. This perspective also prevents analyzing force as a strategy for action of the individual who acts violently and as a reaction to the personal experience of violence and impotence in order to understand the reason why force is used (…).

Other protestations against the broader definition are more extreme. Professor of Education Andreas Flitner points out that a broadening out of the term force leads to blurring causing the various stages of force to become obscure: “I favor an economical and reduced use of the term, but do not want to be mistaken for those who criminalize acts of force without seeing the correlation. (…) With this plea for differentiation, I in no way want to place in question the facts that have made so clear the close relationship between direct physical force or force using weapons, and the type of evil acts of power wielded by unchafed hands and superior minds. What I merely want is that we move away from talking simultaneously of various levels and forms of action in a blurred manner.”

This criticism is to be taken seriously and forces all those who use a generalized notion of violence towards precision, because the challenge for peace education is not diminished by the term being broadened out. It is quite correct to refer to the matter now being one of observing the interrelationship between the escalation stages in the three levels of force in comparison to the past, and searching for opportunities to dam the course.

As with the interpretation of constitutions, the danger of political instrumentalisation becomes clear when specifying terms. Since definitions are not just agreements dealing with contextual meaning, but also questions of power. It is only possible to draw the interests that lie behind this into light of day by way of an encounter with the context and dialogue between all participating parties and individuals.

However, peace education does not just have its point of reference in the negative, by determining what is to be understood by force. What needs to be comprehended in terms of peace can also be defined, whereby a generally applicable definition of peace neither exists nor can exist. Peace is often described as the state of absence of war (negative peace).

But this cannot suffice, since peace is more than a state of non-war and the silence of guns: peace is also defined as a targeted process, the central issue of which is to encourage people through their commitment to express their conflicts using non-violent means, in order to increasingly secure human rights, social justice and democracy.

Abstract from http://www.dadalos.org

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Categories: Peace and Our World
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May
5